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JIM THE UTAH COURT 0* Al'l'LALS 
THE STATE OF — 
Plaintitt/Appellee, 
v. 
GARY D HILFIKER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 93c 
Priority No. ~ 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-~ • ' ^z Kepi. Vol.). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
S< * i * w ui relevant statutes, rules and 
constitution, ^AW» ^ 
STATEMEN1" UI'1 TliJK 11>LU]^ AND STANDARDS OF" REVIEW 
] Pid 1 he trial court commit reversible error i n denying 
Appellant's motion to suppress statements made by Mr. Hilfiker after 
< » K * » i l '» " * i I l 1 l i . m i l , , | ,i I i i , J l J H i i l l J i i i l C I I " ? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed 
question of law and fact. Any underlying factual 
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. The ultimate conclusion as 
to whether Appellant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation in the absence of probable cause 
requires a review for correctness. See State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial cour t err in denying Appel lant's motion 
to suppress evidence based oi i an unlawful detention and arrest, in 
violation of the fourth amendment? 
Standard of Review; This issue involves a mixed 
question of law and fact. Any underlying factual 
determinations are subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. The ultimate conclusion as 
to whether Appellant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation in the absence of probable cause 
requires a review for correctness. See State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated April 27, 1992, the State charged 
Gary D. Hilfiker with one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 
first degree felony, and one count of Aggravated Arson, a first 
degree felony. R. 7. 
Defendant/Appellant Hilfiker filed a "Motion to Suppress 
Statements and All Evidence Secured Through Unlawful Arrest" 
(R. 43-4), a "Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement to Police" 
(R. 45-6), and a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
(R. 47-53). See Addendum B for copies of motions to suppress 
statements. 
Following a hearing held on October 27 and November 2, 
1992, the trial judge denied Appellant's motions. A copy of the 
transcript of the trial judge's denial of the motions is contained 
in Addendum C. 
Following a trial held on November 10-14, 1992, a jury 
convicted Appellant of Homicide, a first degree felony, and 
Aggravated Arson, a first degree felony, as charged in the 
Information. R. 97-8. 
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On December 16, 1992, the trial judge entered judgment and 
conviction, sentencing Appellant to two terms of five years to 
life. R. 146-7. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 24, 1992, at approximately 3:30 a.m., firefighters 
were dispatched to a residence located at 434 Bryan Avenue. 
R. 498. When they arrived, they saw that the house was "fully 
involved in the fire" and "a number of people [were] standing 
outside." R. 499. 
In the front room area, the firefighters found a hole about 
three feet by four feet burned through the floor. R. 500, 627. 
Beneath the hole was the body of a woman, later identified as Marsha 
Haverty. R. 500, 528. The fire was unusual in that it had burned 
down through the floor rather than up. R. 506. A firefighter 
testified that "for a floor to be burned out is very unusual unless 
there has been accelerant poured on it." R. 506. 
Officers eliminated accidental causes for the fire. 
R. 636. A fire investigator believed that the fire was started by 
an accelerant which they thought was kerosene. R. 637. 
The assistant medical examiner testified that Ms. Haverty 
"had been stabbed and cut numerous times on the chest and her face 
and her back," and that she believed Ms. Haverty had bled to death. 
R. 653-4, 655, 674. Any burning injuries to the body occurred after 
death. R. 658. 
One of the firefighters found a knife covered with blood on 
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the lawn near the house. R. 519. A police officer found a jacket 
with blood on it. R. 544. Officers also located a bus parked on a 
cement pad near the house. Both the bus and the cement pad had 
blood on them. R. 547. 
Gary Hilfiker had been living with Marsha Haverty at the 
Bryan Avenue house for a short period of time before her death. 
R. 529. After the fire started, Gary was outside the house and 
"quite concerned that there was somebody in the house." R. 170. 
Gary had blood on his shirt, shoes and socks, and a cut 
hand. R. 182. First aid was administered to Gary at the scene, 
then he was transported to Holy Cross Hospital. R. 170. Gary had a 
cut through the palm of his hand which was stitched at the 
hospital. R. 171. 
Officer Whitaker, who had arrived at the scene at about 
4:00 a.m., left for Holy Cross Hospital at 4:24 a.m., arriving at 
the hospital at 4:55 a.m. R. 177, 171, 175. While Gary's hand was 
being stitched, Officer Whitaker asked Appellant to tell him what 
had happened. R. 172. Gary told the officer that he had used his 
hand to break a window. R. 172. Gary was not Mirandized at the 
hospital. R. 179. 
Jeff Long, a fire investigator, also went to Holy Cross 
Hospital to question Gary. R. 178. 
Officer Whitaker received a call telling him to take Gary 
to the Public Safety Building as the officer was driving away from 
the hospital with Gary in his car. R. 173. According to the 
officer, Gary got excited and stated "that he was positive that they 
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found her inside dead, and they'd think he did it." R. 174. Gary 
also told the officer that "he was quite tired, and that he wanted 
to go home and get some sleep." R. 175, 187. The officer indicated 
that Gary then "said he'd be willing to talk to somebody." R. 175. 
Officer Whitaker arrived at the police station with Gary at 
about 6:05 or 6:10 a.m. and went to a room in the robbery division. 
R. 175, 183. When Homicide Detective Howell arrived, they moved to 
an interrogation room. R. 184, 189. Officer Whitaker stayed with 
Appellant in the interview room until the officer's shift ended at 
about 8:05 a.m. R. 177, 185. During those two hours, Gary did not 
sleep. R. 185. Officer Whitaker did not know whether Gary was in 
pain but indicated that the local anesthetic administered by the 
doctor might have been wearing off. R. 185. 
Before Detective Howell began questioning Gary, Officer 
Whitaker told the detective the information the officer had obtained 
from Gary. R. 188. Detective Howell asked Gary to sign a consent 
to search form. R. 186. Detective Howell did not Mirandize Gary 
during his initial interrogation. After passing the information 
obtained during that initial session to officers at the scene, 
Detective Howell returned to the interrogation room. At that point, 
Detective Howell read Gary his Miranda rights. R. 205, 214-5. 
Homicide Detective Howell had gone to the house on Bryan 
Avenue at about 5:00 a.m. to investigate a fire fatality. R. 190. 
He was shown the knife with blood on it and the blood on three 
vehicles and the house. R. 191. He also saw the body and burn 
pattern "which, according to the fire department and from [his] 
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experience, could possibly have been related to an accelerant being 
used to start this fire," R. 191. Detective Howell had also 
received information from Investigator Long regarding the statements 
made by Gary to the investigator at the hospital. R. 192. 
After Detective Howell questioned Gary the second time, the 
detective returned to the scene. R. 234-5. Detective Howell turned 
Gary over to Homicide Detective Alcock at about 7:30 a.m. 
R. 234-5. Detective Alcock informed Appellant of his Miranda rights 
and began interviewing Appellant at approximately 7:43 a.m. R. 236. 
At about 9:20 a.m., Detective Alcock indicated that the 
officers wanted to take the clothing Appellant was wearing and that 
they would try to locate other clothing for him to wear. R. 237-8. 
Detective Alcock also requested that he be able to draw some blood 
from Appellant for comparison purposes. R. 238-9. 
At that point, Appellant requested an attorney. R. 239. 
According to Detective Alcock, he "terminated the 
interview" when Appellant asked for an attorney. R. 239. Detective 
Timmerman, who was also present during the interview, made a brief 
statement to Appellant after Appellant's request for counsel. 
R. 239-40. 
The detectives did not provide counsel to Gary or let him 
leave the police station or book him into jail. Instead, they 
continued to hold Gary at the police station; Detective Alcock 
accompanied Gary to the police station cafeteria because Gary had 
indicated he was hungry. R. 240-1. Although Detective Alcock did 
not question Appellant during breakfast, he conversed with Appellant 
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about mutual acquaintances and the detective's responsibilities for 
doing taxi cab inspections while the detective worked in the Motor 
Carrier Enforcement Group. R. 241-2. 
After 45 minutes to an hour in the cafeteria, Detective 
Alcock returned Gary to the homicide interrogation room and closed 
the door. R. 242-3. Gary remained alone in that room for several 
minutes, then Detective Alcock returned to the room in order to get 
Gary's clothing. R. 243. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, 
Detective Alcock testified that he did not recall saying anything 
when he reentered the interrogation room, but he may have said, 
"hey, Gary." According to the detective, Gary then stated, "I want 
to tell you what really happened last night. I can't live with this 
anymore." R. 244. At trial, Detective Alcock testified that he 
"opened the door to the interview room and stepped in to say, 'Gary/ 
you know, we've located some clothing. I am going to go down and 
get it. I will be right back.' At which time [Gary] says, 'I need 
to talk to you.'" R. 723. 
Detective Alcock left, obtained a tape recorder and spoke 
with Detective Howell, then returned to the interrogation room at 
about 10:15 a.m. R. 245. Once the tape recorder was on, Detective 
Alcock questioned Gary about his request for counsel, and Gary 
indicated that he was talking to the detective "by my choice." 
R. 249. 
Thereafter, Gary made a statement to officers indicating 
that he had stabbed Ms. Haverty and started the fire. A copy of the 
transcript of that statement is contained in the court record as 
State's Exhibit 37. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant made a clear request for counsel. Officers did 
not provide him with counsel, and Appellant did not thereafter 
initiate further questioning nor intelligently, knowingly or 
voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Any statements made after 
Appellant invoked his right to counsel should have been suppressed. 
Officers detained Appellant for custodial questioning 
without having probable cause to arrest him. Because no attenuation 
occurred between the illegal arrest and subsequent statements, all 
statements made by Appellant after he was detained should have been 
suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION VIOLATED 
THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND MIRANDA V. 
ARIZONA. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution 
provides in part: 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . . 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could best 
be protected by requiring officers to inform individuals prior to 
custodial interrogation that they had certain rights. 
The prosecution may not use any statements, 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
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effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
• • • 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444-5, the Court stated 
that if an accused "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no questioning." The Court clarified that: 
The mere fact that he may have answered some 
questions or volunteered some statements on his 
own does not deprive him of the right to refrain 
from answering any further inquiries until he has 
consulted with an attorney and thereafter 
consents to be questioned. 
Id. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; see State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 
968 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445. 
Once an accused has requested the assistance of counsel, he 
"is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with 
the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 
1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), rehearing denied, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 
L.Ed.2d 984. 
The rule in Edwards requires: 
First, courts must determine whether the accused 
actually invoked his right to counsel . . . 
Second, if the accused invoked his right to 
counsel, courts may admit his responses to 
further questioning only on finding that he 
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(a) initiated further discussions with the 
police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently 
waived the right he invoked. 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 
(1984) (per curiam). 
In State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether 
statements are admissible after an accused has invoked his right to 
counsel. 
[A]n accused's statements made after he has 
invoked his right to counsel and before counsel 
is made available to him are admissible if three 
conditions are satisfied. First, it must be the 
accused, not the law enforcement officers, who 
initiates the conversations in which the 
incriminating statements are made. Second, the 
prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel. Third, the accused's statements must be 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have 
been voluntarily made. 
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236; see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 
103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion). "[W]hen 
an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during 
custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be 
established by showing only that he responded to further 
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised 
of his rights . . . ." State v. Newton# 682 P.2d 295, 297 (Utah 
1984), quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485. 
The Miranda Court clarified that the burden of proof is on 
the prosecution, M[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence, obtained as a 
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result of interrogation can be used against him." Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 479. The Court described the state's burden to prove waiver as a 
"heavy burden." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. "The Courts must presume 
that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden 
is great"; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 
1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355, 357 
(Utah 1980). A court will examine the "totality of the 
circumstances" in order to properly determine whether the right to 
counsel has been properly waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986). That 
determination will depend "upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 
quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 
L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
In the present case, Appellant requested an attorney at 
about 9:20 a.m. R. 202, 236, 239.1 The trial judge found that 
Appellant asked for an attorney at about the time the officer 
requested that he submit to a blood draw. R. 284. Hence, Appellant 
clearly invoked his right to counsel. 
A review of the circumstances demonstrates that Appellant 
did not initiate further discussions with police after invoking his 
right to counsel. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 95; State v. 
1. Detective Howell believed that at 9:30 a.m., he had discussions 
"that [he] would probably be arresting Mr. Hilfiker." R. 228. This 
is also the time at which Detective Howell was informed Mr. Hilfiker 
requested an attorney. R. 202. 
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Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. After Gary indicated he wanted an attorney, 
Officer Timmerman made a brief statement to him. R. 239.2 After 
the Timmerman discussion, the officers "terminated" the interview. 
R. 239. 
Despite the "termination" of the interview, Detective 
Alcock remained with Gary at the police station. R. 239-40. 
Detective Alcock accompanied Gary to the police station cafeteria. 
R. 240-1. About 45 minutes to an hour later, the detective returned 
Gary to the homicide interrogation room and closed the door. 
R. 242-3. 
Detective Alcock left Gary alone in the interrogation room 
for several minutes, then returned to get Gary's clothing. R. 243, 
723. Although the detective's testimony at trial as to what he said 
when he reentered the interrogation room differed from his testimony 
at the motion hearing (compare R. 723, 243-4), it appears that the 
officer communicated to Gary that he intended to take Gary's 
clothing. Despite Gary's request for counsel, he had not seen a 
lawyer and had not been allowed to leave the police station either 
to go home or be booked into jail. From Appellant's perspective, 
the request for counsel had done nothing to either make counsel 
available to him or terminate the requirement that he remain in the 
police station interrogation room and provide evidence to officers. 
Detective Alcock testified that when he returned to the 
2. The trial judge found that Officer Alcock asked "[a] few more 
clarifying questions" after Appellant requested counsel. R. 284. 
- 12 -
interrogation room, Gary said that he needed3 to talk. R. 723. At 
that time, officers were continuing to hold Gary in the police 
interrogation room and attempting to obtain his clothing as 
evidence. This situation is markedly different from the situation 
where a suspect is placed in a cell after invoking his right to 
counsel, then telephones police to initiate continued discussions. 
See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 236; State v. Archuleta, 209 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah 1993). 
Instead, it is similar to the situation in Edwards where 
officers returned to the defendant the day after he had requested 
counsel, without having made counsel available to him. 68 L.Ed.2d 
at 388. The Court indicated in Edwards that the defendant was 
subjected to "custodial interrogation . . . within the meaning of 
Rhode Island v. Innis.11 Edwards v. Arizona, 68 L.Ed.2d at 388. 
Although officers may have stopped directly questioning 
Appellant, their actions in continuing to hold Gary and attempting 
to obtain items of evidence from him created the same atmosphere as 
that which is created by custodial questioning. See Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). 
Gary was never allowed to leave the police station or nearby 
presence of officers; therefore, his discussion with them was a 
continuation of ongoing events and not an independent initiation as 
3. At the motion hearing, the detective claimed that when he 
reentered the interrogation room, Gary said, "I want to tell you 
what really happened last night. I can't live with this anymore." 
R. 243-4. At trial, the quote attributed to Gary at this juncture 
was the less forceful, "I need to talk to you." R. 723. 
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required by Edwards and Moore. 
Nor did Gary knowingly and intelligently waive his right to 
counsel. 
The determination of whether a waiver of the 
right to counsel was made knowingly and 
intelligently depends upon the particular facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case, including 
the background, experience and conduct of the 
accused. 
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted). 
[A] waiver must have been the product of a "'free 
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, 
coercion or deception' and executed with 'full 
awareness both of the nature of the right being 
abandoned and [of] the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it.'" 
State v. Archuleta, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 14 (Utah 1993). 
In the present case, Detective Alcock testified that Gary 
indicated that he wanted to tell the officer what happened at about 
10:15 a.m. R. 244. At that point, Gary had been in police company, 
if not custody, for six hours. R. 171-2, 175, 177, 183, 188, 205. 
Despite his request for counsel an hour or so earlier, no lawyer had 
arrived and officers had not booked Gary into jail or let him go. 
Detective Howell had made it clear two or so hours earlier that Gary 
could not leave. R. 214. Gary was fatigued, having been up all 
night. Although the officer stated that Gary had indicated that it 
was his choice to go forward, the remaining circumstances including 
his fatigue and the continued, lengthy detention demonstrate that 
Gary did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. 
Finally, the circumstances indicate that Gary's statements 
were not voluntary. "The test of whether a confession is voluntary 
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depends upon the totality of the circumstances." Moore, 697 P.2d at 
236. The State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the statement was voluntary. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 
(Utah 1992). 
The test for voluntariness "is never mechanical, but must 
duly consider both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation." Allen, 839 P.2d at 300, citing 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988) (quoting United 
States v. Gordon, 638 F.Supp. 1120, 1145 (W.D. La. 1986)). "The 
ultimate inquiry is, of course, whether physical or psychological 
force or other improper threats or promises prompted the accused to 
talk when he otherwise would not have done so." Allen, 839 P.2d at 
300. 
A number of circumstances contributed to the lack of 
voluntariness. Gary was tired and asked if he could go home and 
sleep before ever being taken to the police station. R. 187. Gary 
complained of fatigue during the interrogation and said he wanted to 
go home. R. 216. He had sustained a severe cut to his hand which 
required stitches; officers were unaware of whether he felt pain but 
gave him aspirin at one point for his hand. The unduly long period 
of questioning coupled with continued detention after requesting 
counsel and the apparent lack of an end to being held at the station 
house also demonstrated the lack of voluntariness. 
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that any 
statements made by Gary after he requested counsel should have been 
suppressed. 
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POINT II. THE CUSTODIAL QUESTIONING OF APPELLANT 
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENTS. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution4 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides in 
pertinent part: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
. . . 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and has 
reasonable cause to believe the person 
arrested committed it. 
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 
L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment requires that officers have probable cause in order 
to detain an individual for custodial questioning. 442 U.S. at 
216. In Dunaway, an informant gave information to officers 
suggesting that the defendant might have been involved in a 
murder/robbery which occurred at a pizza parlor. The officer told 
other officers to "pick up" the defendant" and "bring him in." Id. 
at 203. Three officers found the defendant and took him to the 
4. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 
L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 
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police station and placed him in an interrogation room. Although 
the defendant was not formally arrested and the State claimed that 
he voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station, the court 
determined otherwise. 
In reaching its decision that the detention required 
probable cause, the Court compared the limited and "narrowly 
circumscribed intrusions" which are allowed under Terry v. Ohiof 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny with 
the detention of the defendant. The Court pointed out that the 
detention of the defendant "was in important respects 
indistinguishable from a traditional arrest." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 
212. 
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he 
was found. Instead, he was taken from a 
neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a 
police station, and placed in an interrogation 
room. He was never informed that he was "free to 
go"; indeed, he would have been physically 
restrained if he had refused to accompany the 
officers or had tried to escape their custody. 
The application of the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of probable cause does not depend on 
whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed 
an "arrest" under state law. The mere facts that 
petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was 
not "booked", and would not have had an arrest 
record if the interrogation had proved fruitless, 
while not insignificant for all purposes 
[citation omitted], obviously does not make 
petitioner's seizure even roughly analogous to 
the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry 
and its progeny. 
The determination of whether a custodial interrogation 
occurred is based on an objective test, "i.e., that 'the only 
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position 
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would have understood his situation./,f State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 
1100 (Utah 1991), quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 
104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), and citing Hunter v. 
State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979) ("The question is not whether 
the particular defendant considered himself in custody, but whether 
a 'reasonable person [under the same circumstances] would feel he 
was not free to leave and break off police questioning./M). 
In Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court "restated four of the most important 
factors in determining whether an accused who has not been formally 
arrested is in custody." Those factors are: 
(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the accused; 
(3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of the 
interrogation. 
In Sampson, this Court found a fifth factor, "(5) whether 
the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly," pertinent to the analysis. Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105, 
citing State v. Herrera, 621 P.2d 1209 (Or. App. 1980); see also 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Mirguet, 844 P.2d 995, 997-8 (Utah App. 1992). 
Custodial interrogation includes "not only . . . express 
questioning, but also any words or action on the part of the 
police . . . that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 
446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). 
Having determined that the custodial questioning of the 
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defendant violated the Fourth Amendment, the Dunaway Court also 
considered "whether the connection between this unconstitutional 
police conduct and the incriminating statements and sketches 
obtained during petitioner's illegal detention were sufficiently 
attenuated to permit the use at trial." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216. 
The burden of establishing that the illegality was not exploited 
rests on the State. 442 U.S. at 218. Relying on Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Court 
articulated several factors to be considered in determining whether 
"the statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of 
his arrest." 422 US at 217. 
The temporal proximity of the arrest and the 
confession, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, ... and, particularly, the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 
In concluding that the statements were obtained by 
exploiting the illegal arrest, the Court focused on the lack of 
intervening circumstances and the fact that "the arrest without 
probable cause had a 'quality of purposefulness' in that it was an 
'expedition for evidence' admittedly undertaken 'in the hope that 
something might turn up./M 442 U.S. at 218, quoting Brown, 422 U.S. 
at 605. 
The situation in this case is virtually a replica 
of the situation in Brown. Petitioner was also 
admittedly seized without probable cause in the 
hope that something might turn up, and confessed 
without any intervening event of significance, 
[footnote omitted]. 
. . . 
No intervening events broke the connection 
between petitioner's illegal detention and his 
confession. To admit petitioner's confession in 
such a case would allow "law enforcement officers 
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to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, 
safe in the knowledge that they could wash their 
hands in the 'procedural safeguards' of the 
Fifth." 
442 U.S. at 219. 
In Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 1664, 73 
L.Ed.2d 314 (1982), the Court also held that a confession obtained 
through custodial interrogation should have been suppressed as the 
fruit of the illegal arrest. The Court indicated that obtaining an 
arrest warrant after the defendant was taken into custody or 
allowing the defendant to talk to his girlfriend were not 
intervening events which broke "the connection between the illegal 
arrest and the confession." The Court also reaffirmed its 
determinations in Brown and Dunaway that police conduct is flagrant 
and purposeful and therefore suggests exploitation of the illegality 
where officers "effectuate[] an investigatory arrest without 
probable cause" in the hope of obtaining information. 457 U.S. at 
693. See also State v. Thurmanf 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 
1993) . 
A review of the facts in the present case demonstrates that 
(1) Appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation, (2) the 
officers lacked probable cause to arrest, and (3) there was no 
attenuation between the illegal arrest and subsequent statements so 
as to permit admission of the statements. 
A. APPELLANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION. 
- 20 -
1. Site of the Interrogation 
Although the questioning began at the scene then moved to 
the hospital (R. 173, 178, 775, 778), Gary was ultimately 
transported from the hospital to the police station at the request 
of the homicide detective, R. 195, 173, 195.5 
When Officer Whitaker and Gary arrived at the police 
station at about 6:05 a.m., they went to an office in the robbery 
division. R. 175, 183. However, when Homicide Detective Howell was 
ready to question Gary, Appellant was moved to an "interview" or 
interrogation room. R. 184, 195. 
Detective Howell had two conversations with Gary during a 
45-minute period. R. 691. After attempting to obtain consent to 
search during the first conversation, Detective Howell stopped the 
conversation so that he could converse with officers at the crime 
scene. R. 692. Detective Howell Mirandized Appellant during the 
second conversation. R. 197. This was apparently the first time 
Gary was Mirandized. 
This Court has recognized that "[s]tation house questioning 
lends itself to a finding of custody, . . . although that fact alone 
is not conclusive." Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105. The continued 
police escort and questioning from the time Appellant left the 
scene, coupled with the ultimate arrival at the police station and 
5. Detective Howell testified at the motion hearing that Officer 
Whitaker radioed him from the hospital and "said that Mr. Hilfiker 
was done with his treatment and that he was bringing him back to the 
scene." R. 195. Detective Howell then requested that Whitaker take 
Gary to the police station. R. 195. 
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transfer to an "interview" room for further questioning, 
demonstrates that Appellant was in custody from the moment he left 
the hospital enroute to the police station, if not sooner. 
2. Focus of Investigation on the Accused 
The investigation focused on Appellant shortly after the 
fire. Both Officer Whitaker and Arson Investigator Long went to the 
hospital to question Gary. R. 173, 178, 775, 778. Investigator 
Long's purpose in talking to Gary at the hospital was to find out 
how the fire started; he asked Gary a number of questions including 
whether Gary had started the fire. R. 776, 778. At about 
6:00 a.m., Detective Howell directed that Appellant be taken to the 
police station rather than home after he finished at the hospital. 
R. 195. 
Detective Howell suspected a homicide and focused on 
Appellant because of the bloody knife, bloody clothing, suspicious 
burn pattern, the bloody jackets, and lack of forced entry, all of 
which he was aware of while at the scene between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. 
R. 198. Indeed, Detective Howell told Gary during Detective 
Howell's second interview at about 7:00 a.m. that the detective did 
not want to let Gary go until he got some idea of what happened. 
R. 214. 
3. Indicia of Arrest 
Although Appellant was not handcuffed, other indicia of 
arrest were present. As was the case in Sampson, Appellant was not 
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informed that he was free to leave. In fact, when Officer Whitaker 
told Gary of the request to go to the police station, Gary became 
agitated. R. 174. He indicated that he was tired and wanted to go 
home to get some sleep. R. 175. Nevertheless, Officer Whitaker 
persisted in his "request" that Appellant go to the police station. 
R. 175. A little while later, when Detective Howell was 
interviewing Gary, Gary indicated that he was tired and wanted to go 
home and sleep before being questioned by Detective Howell. 
R. 216. In his report, Detective Howell wrote that "the arrested 
person indicated a desire to leave, so I detained him." R. 216. 
Detective Howell testified further that he did not let Appellant 
leave at 7:15 a.m. R. 222. A reasonable person in these 
circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave. 
4. Length and Form of Questioning 
Appellant was in police company from shortly after 
4:00 a.m. until late morning. He was repeatedly questioned at the 
scene, the hospital, and the police station by various officers. 
R. 170, 175, 176, 178, 775, 778, 234-5, 238-9. Officers asked 
Appellant to account for his whereabouts and early on, while still 
at the hospital, asked whether he had started the fire. R. 172. 
The length and form of the questioning demonstrates the custodial 
nature of the questioning. 
- 23 -
5. Whether Appellant Went to Police Station 
Voluntarily 
Finally, although Officer Whitaker testified that Appellant 
agreed to go to the police station, the officer's testimony 
demonstrates that Appellant did not "freely," "willingly" or 
"voluntarily" go downtown. The officer had been requested to take 
Appellant downtown. R. 173. The officer's testimony regarding this 
"request" suggests that it was not subject to the consent or 
agreement of Appellant. R. 173. When informed of the request, Gary 
became agitated and said he wanted to go home and sleep. R. 174-5. 
Nevertheless, Officer Whitaker persisted in his "request" and drove 
Gary to the police station. This situation is markedly different 
from that in Sampson where the defendant drove himself to the police 
station but was nevertheless subjected to custodial interrogation. 
A reasonable person in Gary's position would have believed 
he was in custody from the moment Officer Whitaker turned his car in 
the direction of the police station. 
B. OFFICERS LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST 
APPELLANT. 
An officer may arrest an individual without a 
warrant either when he has reasonable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed and that the 
person arrested committed it or when the officer 
has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense and there is a 
reasonable basis for believing the person will 
destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of 
the offense. 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-7-2 (Supp. 1989); State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
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App. 1989). 
Probable cause is determined by assessing the totality of 
the circumstances from an objective standard. Bartley, 784 P.2d at 
1236. The test is 
whether from the facts known to the officer, and 
the inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his 
position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect had committed the offense. 
Bartley, 784 P.2d at 1236, citing State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 
(Utah 1983), et al. 
In this case, the officers did not have probable cause to 
arrest Gary. Officer Whitaker knew that Gary was concerned that a 
woman was inside the burning house. R. 170. The officer was aware 
of Gary's cut hand and the blood on his clothing and thought Gary's 
explanation about how he hurt his hand had some inconsistencies. 
R. 172. 
At the time that Officer Whitaker was told to take Gary to 
the police station, officers had found the body. R. 191. They 
found a knife outside the home with blood on it. R. 191. They also 
found blood on three vehicles, two jackets which appeared to have 
blood on them, and what they considered to be a questionable burn 
pattern from the fire. R. 190, 191, 199, 519, 544, 547. Although 
Gary had blood on him, his hand was severely cut. Officer Whitaker, 
who observed Gary and the blood, considered Gary a witness rather 
than a suspect. R. 187. 
While the officers had information suggesting that a 
homicide occurred, they did not have sufficient information 
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suggesting that Gary had committed the homicide such that "a 
reasonable and prudent person in his position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed the offense." The lack of 
probable cause to arrest Gary is emphasized by Detective Howell's 
decision not to Mirandize Gary during the initial interview at the 
police station, the delay until 9:30 a.m. in discussing a formal 
arrest, and the failure to place Gary under arrest until after his 
statement. R. 188, 205, 214-5. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers did 
not have probable cause to arrest Gary when they took him to the 
police station and subjected him to custodial interrogation. 
C. NO ATTENUATION OCCURRED BETWEEN THE ILLEGAL 
ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS. 
Finally, any statements made by Appellant must be 
suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The custody and 
interrogation involved in this case was ongoing from the time 
Appellant left the scene until several hours later, while still 
being questioned by officers. Despite the fact that Appellant 
apparently had not slept all night and indicated at about 6:00 a.m. 
that he was tired and needed sleep, officers continued to hold and 
question him until late morning, when they booked him into the 
jail. Officers did allow Appellant to eat at some point, but he was 
accompanied by an officer throughout that meal. R. 240. Indeed, 
even after Appellant requested counsel, officers continued to hold 
him at the police station. See discussion supra at 11-14. No 
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intervening event which broke "the connection between the illegal 
arrest and the confession" occurred in this case. 
In addition, it is apparent that the officers "effectuated 
an investigatory arrest without probable cause" in the hope of 
obtaining information from Appellant. Hence, the police conduct was 
flagrant and purposeful, demonstrating further that the illegality 
was exploited. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 217; Thurman, 203 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. 
Officers arrested Appellant in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. All statements made by Appellant flowed from that 
violation and should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this / day of June, 1993. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
TOUTED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
rnra UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
eflects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly deyhhtng the place to be «JMtfr»h«ri ^d the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Const. Amend ^ reads: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against hi™; to have compulsory 
process for. obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State «h«H make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
77-7-Z. X>y peace u u ^ - e n . 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been commit-
ted and has reasonable cause to believe, that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person 
may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another 
person. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
ADDENDUM B 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON, (#4745) ,7
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LESHIA LEE-DIXON, (#5871) ^> Lu L 57 Tn J*. 
Attorneys for Defendant •- ,CT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
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424 East 500 South, Suite, 304V \JV-* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARY D. HILFIKER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS 
AND ALL EVIDENCE SECURED 
THROUGH UNLAWFUL ARREST AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. 921900991FS 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the defendant, GARY D. HILFIKER, by and through 
his counsel of record, CANDICE A. JOHNSON and LESHIA LEE-DIXON and 
respectfully move to suppress statements and all other derivative 
evidence secured when defendant was subjected to an unlawful 
detention and arrest without probable cause. The defendant claims 
that statements and other evidence seized from his person at the 
police station were the product of the illegality of the defendant's 
detention and unlawful arrest in violation of those protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendments of the Utah Constitution and 
Article I §7 and §14 of the Utah State Constitution. Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 
000043 
(1979), Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). 
DATED this ££_ day of October, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Monday, 
the 26th day of October, 1992, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. before the 
honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this ^/ day of October, 1992. 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Greg Bown at the 
office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^ ^<3ay of October, 1992. 
s 
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Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARY D. HILFIKER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S 
STATEMENT TO POLICE AND NOTICE 
OF HEARING 
Case No. 921900991FS 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the defendant, GARY D. HILFIKER, through counsel, 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON and LESHIA LEE-DIXON and moves this court to 
suppress his confession made while in police custody on April 24, 
1992. Defendant claims that his statement should be suppressed 
pursuant to his constitutional protections guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I §12 and 
§14 of the Utah State Constitution. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), Smith v. Illinois 469 U.S. 91 (1984); and State v. 
0U0045 
Griffin 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988). 
DATED this £/_ day of October, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
J&W& 
N^DICE A. JOHNSON 
Attorney for ^ Defendant 
Attorney for 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Monday, 
the 26th day of October, 1992, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. before the 
honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this Jtf day of October, 1992. 
^ >*W%^/; 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Greg Bown at the 
office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this ^^ day of October, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM C 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: At about 4:00 a.m. on April 
24th, 1992, a fire occurred at 434 Bryan Avenue. 
Defendant, a resident of said address, was present, 
and was discovered by the fire personnel as well as 
the police officers. And around 4:30 a.m. on that 
date, the police rendered first aid to the Defendant, 
Gary D. Hilfiker. 
Following the rendition of first aid, 
the Defendant was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for 
treatment of a badly or severely lacerated right 
hand • 
When the medical treatment at Holy Cress 
was completed and Officer Whitaker started to return 
the Defendant back to his home at 434 Bryan Avenue, 
Officer Singer (sic) contacted Whitaker by phone and 
directed him to transport the Defendant to the Public 
Safety Building. That occurred some time around 6:00 
a.m. on April the 24th, 1992. And the Defendant and 
Officer Whitaker arrived at the Public Safety Building 
sometime shortly after 6:00 a.m., 6:20 a.m., on that 
morning. 
When Officer Whitaker indicated they 
were going to the Public Safety Building, the 
Defendant was initially excited, and indicated that 
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1 they had found the body and that they thought he did 
2 it. Officer Whitaker, himself, didn't consider 
3 Defendant under arrest, asked Defendant to answer some 
41 questions and the Defendant said he was willing to 
5 talk with someone. 
6 When they arrived at the Public Safety 
7 Building, Officer Whitaker subsequently turned the 
8 Defendant over to Officer Howell sometime after 6:00 
91 a.m. 
10 Detective Howell, who was with the 
11 Homicide Unit, was the assigned detective in charge of 
12 the -- first of the fire, and then of the homicide. 
13 Around 6:30 a.m., Officer Howell took 
14 Defendant into an interview room there in the Arson 
15 Division, and interviewed the Defendant for 
16 approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 
17 MR. BOWN: I believe that was the 
18 Robbery Division. 
19 THE COURT: The Robbery Division, I 
20 stand corrected. Thank you. 
211 The subject matter of that interview 
22 generally related to the searching of the house and 
23 the vehicles and the property located at 434 Bryan 
241 Avenue. 
25 At that point, the officers had found 
3 
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1 the body of Marsha Haverty* They had found a knife 
2 with blood on it out in the yard. They had found 
3 blood on three cars* They had found an accelerant 
4 burn pattern in the building. They had observed a 
5 jacket inside of the cab with blood on it; a white 
6 jacket behind the house with blood on it. And the 
7 jackets appeared to have a common logo on them. 
81 They had found that there was no forced 
9 entry into the house. They had found that the 
10 Defendant had blood on his shoes, pants and shirt. 
11 They had questioned Defendant, who they 
12 knew to be a resident at that address, briefly about 
13 how the fire had started. And during that interview, 
14 there was not an adequate explanation of his 
15 whereabouts for the prior two hours. 
16 Officer Howell asked Defendant for 
17 permission to search the home and the vehicle, and 
18 Defendant gave his consent for the search. To that 
19 point, there had had been no Miranda Warning, and 
20 nothing incriminatory had been said. 
21 Officer Howell then went about preparing 
22 the consent document. 
23 At that point, Defendant was moved to an 
24 interview room in the Homicide Division there on the 
25 sixth floor of the Public Safety Building. 
4 
000282 
1 
21 
3 
41 
51 
61 
7 
81 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
2 2 
23 
2 4 
2 5 
Defendant was given the Miranda Warning 
as the interview started in the Homicide Section about 
6:50 a.m. 
Officer Howell advised Defendant he 
didn't want to let him go until he got more 
information. He advised Defendant he was detaining 
him. 
Officer Howell continued the 
interrogation until about 7:15 a.m., even though 
Defendant had indicated he was tired and wanted to get 
some sleep. 
No incriminatory statements had been 
made . 
Defendant had not been placed under 
formal arrest. 
Sometime near that time. Officer Howell 
turned the Defendant over to Officer Whitaker (sic), 
who was in the interrogation room. Officer Howell 
gave instructions to Officer Alcock to continue the 
interrogation. Officer Alcock continued the 
interrogation. 
At about 9:00 a.m., the first side of 
the tape was full, the tape was turned over and 
Officer Alcock reminded the Defendant again of his 
Miranda Rights. The interview continued until around 
5 
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1 9:14 a.m. 
2 A request was made to draw blood from 
3 the Defendant. At that time, Defendant said: "I want 
4 a lawyer now." 
5 A few more clarifying questions were 
6 asked by Officer Alcock, he terminated the 
7 interrogation and asked no more questions about either 
8 the fire or the homicide. 
9 Defendant made a comment to Alcock that 
10 he was hungry, so he and the Defendant went to 
11 breakfast in the Public Safety Building Cafeteria 
12 downstairs. 
13 No questions were asked about the fire 
14 or the homicide. 
15 After breakfast, the Defendant and 
IS Alcock returned to the interview room. 
17 During the second interview, there had 
18 been discussions about taking Defendant's clothing 
19 because of the bloodstains, thereon, and there had 
20 been discussions about getting a change of clothes. 
21 Evidence had called about that time, and advised that 
22 they had located a change of clothing for the 
23 Defendant so that Defendant's clothing could be 
24 examined• 
25 Officer Alcock was briefly out of the 
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1 interrogation room, he returned and advised the 
2 Defendant that the clothing were available and that 
3 arrangements could be made to change out of the soiled 
4 clothing* 
5 At that point, the Defendant indicated 
6 to Officer Alcock that he wanted to tell him 
7 something. 
8 Alcock, at that point, left the room to 
9 secure a tape recorder. He returned with a tape 
10 recorder, and reminded the Defendant that the officers 
11 had advised him of his rights, which the Defendant 
12 acknowledged. 
13 Officer Alcock then reminded Defendant 
14 that he still had the right to an attorney. 
15 Defendant, following that admonition, 
16 indicated that it was his wish to go ahead. 
17 Thereafter, the Defendant made his 
18 confession. 
19 The Defendant, following the medical 
20 treatment, went to the Public Safety Building 
21 willingly and voluntarily. Well before he gave any 
22 incriminatory information, he was advised of -- given 
23 the Miranda Warnings. 
24 He voluntarily gave his consent to the 
25 search of his premises and vehicles. 
7 
ji He was again reminded of his rights at 
2 the end of the first tape. 
3 When Officer Zimmerman (sic) sought to 
4 draw a blood sample and Defendant asked for a lawyer/ 
5 the interrogation was stopped. 
6 Officer Alcock, thereafter, took 
7 Defendant to breakfast. Nothing was discussed 
8 relating to the homicide or the arson during 
9 breakfast; although, there was a brief discussion 
10 about Defendant's injured hand, and the aspirins were 
11 secured for the hand. 
12 When they returned to the interrogation 
13 room and Officer Alcock advised the Defendant that th 
14 clothing had been secured and were ready, the 
15 Defendant, without any provocation from Officer 
16 Alcock, advised the Defendant (sic) that he wanted to 
17 tell him something. 
18 At that point. Officer Alcock again 
19 reminded him of his Miranda Rights, which the 
20 Defendant acknowledged he understood. 
21 Officer Alcock, again, reminded him of 
22 his right to an attorney. And notwithstanding the 
23 second admonition. Defendant advised Officer Alcock 
24 that he wished to continue. 
25 The Court finds and concludes the 
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statements, thereafter, were voluntary and not 
coerced. 
At the time the Defendant was asked to 
consent to the search of his home and vehicles, the 
officers had probable cause to secure a search 
warrant. Defendant voluntarily gave his permission 
for the searches. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes, afte 
considering the totality of the circumstances, that 
Defendant's motion to suppress the confession taken 
the Public Safety Building should be denied, and tha 
the seizure of the Defendant was done with probable 
cause and was not illegal. 
